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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS-
THE END OF THE SELECTIVE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR
Guy Porter Gillette was convicted of willful refusal to report for in-
duction into the armed forces. Gillette defended on the ground that he
was entitled to an exemption from induction as a conscientious objector
("C.O.") to war. Gillette's claim to C.O. status was based solely upon
his opposition to the war in Vietnam, rather than an opposition to all
war. His claim was based upon a "humanistic" approach to religion
that the war in Vietnam was an "unjust" war that was contrary to his
conscience and his deeply held views concerning the purpose of human
existence.' After the district court upheld the administrative denial of
exemption, the court of appeals, in affirming the lower court, concluded
that Gillette's conscientious beliefs "were specifically directed against the
war in Vietnam," while the relevant exemption provision of the Military
Selective Service Act of 1967, "requires opposition 'to participation in war
in any form.' ",2
In a companion case, Louis Negre, a Roman Catholic, sought dis-
charge from the Army as a conscientious objector to war after receipt of
orders for Vietnam duty. Negre based his claim to C.O. status on: (1)
His belief that it was his duty as a Catholic to discriminate between
"just" and "unjust" wars and to forswear participation in the latter, (2)
that the war in Vietnam was "unjust", (3) participation in the Vietnam
War would contravene his conscience and what he had been taught by
his religious training.3 Habeas relief was denied, and the denial was af-
firmed on appeal, because, in the language of the court of appeals,
Negre "objects to the war in Vietnam, not to all wars," and therefore
does "not qualify for separation [from the Army], as a conscientious
objector."'4
The issue, in these companion cases, is whether a selective conscien-
tious objector, i.e., an objector opposed to participation in a particular
war rather than all war, is entitled to exemption from military service
as a conscientious objector?
1. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
2. Gillette v. United States, 420 F.2d 298, 299-300 (2d Cir. 1970); MILITARY
SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT OF 1967, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1964 Supp. V).
3. Supra note 1, at 440-441.
4. Negre v. Larsen, 418 F.2d 908, 909-910 (9th Cir. 1969).
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The Supreme Court of the United States, in deciding these cases
jointly, held that neither Gillette nor Negre was entitled to exemption
from military service as a conscientious objector under the Military Se-
lective Service Act of 1967.5
The Court held that, although Gillette and Negre met the statutory
requirement of sincerity of religious training and belief, they failed to
meet the statutory requirement of opposition to all war. Gillette v.
United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
This decision is significant because it is the first time that the Su-
preme Court has ruled upon an individual's claim to C.O. exemption
from military service by virtue of his opposition to a particular war. It
represents a reversal of liberal construction of conscientious objector ex-
emptions, and it poses constitutional problems with respect to the "free
exercise" and "establishment" of religion clauses of the Constitution.
The purpose of this note is to analyze the Gillette case within the his-
torical context of conscientious objector legislation and case law and
the "free exercise" and "establishment" of religion clauses of the Con-
stitution.
Conscientious objector exemptions from military service have been
recognized, in one form or another, by the legislative branch and en-
forced by the judicial branch since 1775 when the Continental Congress
announced its resolve to respect the beliefs of people who because of
religious principles could not bear arms.6 This resolve was given statu-
tory recognition in 1864 when Congress explicitly exempted from the
federal draft persons who "are conscientiously opposed to the bearing
of arms, and who are prohibited from doing so by the rules and articles
of faith [of their] religious denominations. . . ."7 These standards
were further revised during World War I in the Draft Act of 1917
which exempted members of
any well-recognized religious sect or organization ... whose existing creed or
principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form and whose religious
convictions are against war . . . . (Emphasis added).
5. MILITARY SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT OF 1967, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 456(j), 6(j)
(1964 Supp. V) [hereinafter cited as "Act of 1967"]. The relevant provisions of
this Act have not been changed by subsequent acts or the Draft Law of 1971.
"Nothing contained in this title . . . shall be construed to require any person to
be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United
States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to
participation in war in any form." (Emphasis added).
6. Selective Service System Monograph No. 11, Conscientious Objection 29-38,
at 33-34 (1950).
7. ACT OF FEBRUARY 24, 1864, ch. 13, § 17, 13 Stat. 9.
8. ACT OF MAY 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 4 at 78, 40 Stat. 76.
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This Act, while following the 1864 statute with respect to membership
in a religious sect, added the requirement of total pacifism by limiting
C.O. exemptions to members of religious sects who were forbidden to
"participate in war in any form."
Draft legislation in 1940 dropped the requirement of church member-
ship or sectarian affiliation and provided for exemption to anyone "who,
by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to
war in any form." (Emphasis added).
A conflict developed over the breadth of the phrase "religious training
and belief." In United States v. Kauten,10 Judge Augustus Hand in dic-
turn interpreted the clause to include an exemption to any individual
whose conscientious scrupple against war in any form was a response
to an inward mentor, whether that mentor be conscience or God. 1
This dictum which allowed conscientious exemption regardless of church
affiliation or belief in a Supreme Being became the law of the second
circuit in United States v. Badt. 2
The ninth circuit, on the other hand, construed the statute to require
belief in a deity and implied adherence to a religious organization in
Berman v. United States.1 3  Since the Supreme Court refused to hear
the Berman case,' 4 the circuits remained in conflict until 1948 when
Congress, in revising the selective service laws, defined "religious train-
ing and belief" as "an individual's belief in relation to a Supreme
Being. ... 15
This statutory requirement that an individual, although he need not
be a member of a religious sect, must demonstrate an aversion to war,
the source of which must stem from a belief in a Supreme Being, was
never seriously challenged in the courts until 1965 in United States v.
Seeger.16  In this case the court at the circuit level declared the 1948
9. AcT OF SEPTEMBER 16, 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 885, 889.
10. United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
11. Id. at 708. Kauten is also cited as the earliest decision to require opposi-
tion to all war, but Mr. Justice Hand's view that less than total opposition was a
political rather than a religious belief is merely dictum.
12. 141 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1944); see, Phillips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521 (2d
Cir. 1943).
13. 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
14. Id.
15. AcT OF JUNE 24, 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604 (1948).
16. United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964), aff'd on other grounds,
380 U.S. 163 (1965). By expanding the construction of the statute, the Court was
able to keep it intact.
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Act unconstitutional since the statutory requirement of a religious belief
in a Supreme Being for C.O. exemption excluded non-theistic objectors
and thereby provided for the establishment of pacifistic, theistic religions
contrary to the first amendment's establishment clause and the fifth
amendment's due process clause which require neutrality in dealing with
religions. 17 The Supreme Court by providing a broad construction of the
statute was able to bypass the constitutional issues presented by the cir-
cuit court and include Seeger, who held a sincere, non-theistic belief
against the war, within the definition of religion contained in the statute.
Congress, in using the expression 'Supreme Being' rather than the designation
'God,' was merely clarifying the meaning of religious training and belief so as to
embrace all religions and to exclude essentially political, sociological, or philosophi-
cal views. We believe that under this construction, the test of belief 'in a rela-
tion to a Supreme Being' is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful
occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox
belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption. Where such be-
liefs have parallel positions in the lives of their respective holders we cannot say
that one is 'in a relation to a Supreme Being' and the other is not.18
This parallel test as established in Seeger to avoid constitutional
problems expanded C.O. exemptions from religious beliefs derived from
religion or a belief in a deity to individuals with non-theistic, but re-
ligious beliefs so long as these beliefs were derived from a parallel, ulti-
mate source equivalent to a deity. The Court, however, failed to provide
an adequate test for these parallel beliefs except to exclude those persons
"who . . . decide on the basis of essentially political, sociological or eco-
nomic considerations that war is wrong and that they will have no part
of it."'19 The Seeger decision was incorporated into the Act of 1967
which deleted "Supreme Being" and excluded political, sociological or
philosophical veiws from C.O. exemption.2 0
This liberalization of C.O. exemption, particularly with respect to
the "religious training and belief" requirement, culminated with Welsh
v. United States,2" when the Supreme Court clarified the parallel test es-
tablished in Seeger. In Welsh, the Court held that a non-theistic objector
qualifies for exemption to the extent he holds sincere ethical or moral
17. Supra note 16, at 851-853. The theistic vs. non-theistic arguments of
Seeger would seem to add impetus to Negre's claim based on just vs. unjust war
principles since, as a Catholic, Negre's arguments encompass the same obstacles of
free exercise and equal protection.
18 Supra note 16, at 165-166.
19. Supra note 16, at 173.
20. MILITARY SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 456(j), 6(j) (1964
Supp. V).
21. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
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beliefs in opposition to participation in war and these beliefs function as
a religion in the registrant's life. 22
The long term liberalization of the various "religious training and be-
lief" clauses in conscientious objector legislation was not complemented
with any compatible development of the "participation in war in any
form" clause. Registrants failed to seriously or consistently challenge
the constitutional validity of this clause until the Vietnam War, with the
exception of theistic registrants who refused to fight in all war, except
a theocratic war.23 Although the clause first appeared in the Act of
191724 and has not varied in form through the Act of 1967,25 it was not
discussed by the courts until 1943 in Kauten26 when Judge Hand stated
in dictum:
There is a distinction between a course of reasoning resulting in a conviction that
a particular war is inexpedient or disastrous and a conscientious objection to parti-
cipation in any war under any circumstances. The latter, and not the former,
may be the basis of exemption under the Act [Act of 1940]. The former is
usually a political objection .... 27
The only other instances of court decisions discussing or affecting the
requirement of "opposition to participation in war in any form" prior
to the Vietnam War have been the theocratic war cases following the
Supreme Court's holding in Sicurella v. United States. 28 In that case
the Court avoided discussion of constitutional implications of the clause
and determined that Congress had in mind opposition to participation
in "real shooting wars when it referred to participation in war in any
form" 29 and not theocratic, biblical or holy wars. 30
22. Id., see also United States v. Thaxter, 437 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1971) which
held that moral and ethical beliefs may be mixed with political or policy considera-
tions and Welsh still applies.
23. Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955) which defined a theocratic
war as an Armageddon or holy war waged on orders of Jehovah in defense of ant
individual's faith.
24. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 4 at 78, 40 Stat. 76.
25. MurLARY SELECrivE SERVICE ACT OF 1967, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 456(j),
6(j) (1964 Supp. V). Nor was the wording changed in the current draft law, The
Draft Act of 1971.
26. Supra note 10.
27. Supra note 10, at 708. Chief Justice Hughes in his famous dissent in
United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931), stated that an applicant should
not be disqualified from C.O. status merely because his religious beliefs were
based upon a just vs. unjust war theory.
28. Supra note 23; see also United States v. Carroll, 398 F.2d 651 (3rd Cir.
1968); Kretchet v. United States, 284 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1960); Jessen v. United
States, 212 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1954).
29. Supra note 23, at 391. The Court stated that the test was not a registrant's
opposition to all war, but rather his opposition, on religious grounds to participation
1972] 1055
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With the increasing dissatisfaction with United States' involvement in
Vietnam, registrants seeking C.O. exemption began focusing their re-
quests for exemption on the unjustness of the war in Vietnam rather than
aversion to all war. As a result the courts were confronted with the
selective conscientious objector who was opposed to "unjust" wars, but
who would participate in "just" wars. This doctrine that an individual
may determine which wars are "just" or "unjust" and, acting in ac-
cordance with his conscience, refrain from participation in the latter was
first adopted and incorporated into the teachings of Catholicism. 31  The
doctrine essentially provides that an individual must act according to his
conscience and determine whether a particular war is unjust, and, if he
finds it to be unjust, refrain from participation therein.3 2 The majority
of registrants who adopted this doctrine in pre-Gillette cases were denied
C.O. status on grounds other than their failure to oppose all war. These
denials of C.O. status ranged from procedural grounds3 3 to the insin-
cerity of registrants' beliefs34 in accordance with the Seeger-Welsh guide-
lines.3 5
Two courts prior to Gillette confronted the "just-unjust" war doctrine
and the constitutional issues raised by such a religious stance. They de-
clared the "participation in war in any form" clause unconstitutional be-
cause it violated the free exercise, equal protection and establishment of
religion clauses of the Constitution. In the first of these cases, United
States v. McFadden,-' defendant applied for C.O. status on the grounds
in war. Such a statement leads to the logical construction that a registrant need
only be opposed to some war.
30. Supra note 23, at 390-391.
31. ST. AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD Bk. XIX ch. 7, Bk. IV chs. 14, 15 (Image
Books ed. 1958); ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW 72 (Gateway Press Inc.
ed. 1963). Although Catholicism was the initial proponent of the just vs. unjust
war doctrine, the universal incorporation of this dogma into other religions is evi-
denced in the amicus curiae briefs filed in the Gillette case by the National Council
of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. (composed of eight religious sects with
42,000,000 members) and the American Jewish Congress.
32. Supra note 3, at 440-441; see Douglas' dissent in Gillette v. United States,
401 U.S. 437, 470-474 (1971); United States v. McFadden, 309 F. Supp. 502
(N.D. Cal. 1970); United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969).
33. See United States v. Spiro, 384 F.2d 159 (3rd Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 956 (1968); Noyd v. McNamara, 378 F.2d 538 (10th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Kurki, 384 F.2d 905 (7th Cir. 1967).
34. See Davenport v. Laird, 440 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1971); Armstrong v.
Laird, 325 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Mass. 1971).
35. Supra note 16. See Welsh v. United States, supra note 21.
36. 309 F. Supp. 502 (N.D. Cal. 1970). The judgment was vacated and re-
manded in 401 U.S. 2 (1971) in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Gillette.
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that he believed that the war in Vietnam was unjust, and to submit to
induction would violate his conscience. His beliefs were based upon his
training and belief in the Catholic religion and the sincerity of his belief
was not at issue.37 The essence of his claim was the role played by
one's conscience in Catholic doctrine. Judge Alfonso J. Zirpoli capsulized
that doctrine as follows:
There exists a divine law. This law is perceived by man through his conscience.
When man detects this law of God which is written in his conscience he must obey
its commands. If the laws of man are contrary to the law of God, as seen
through one's conscience, the individual must obey God.3 8
Defendant argued that Section 6(j) of the Act of 1967, while allowing
pacifist religious objectors an exemption, placed him, as a selective con-
scientious objector, in the unconstitutional position of violating a cardinal
principle of his religion or suffering the consequences of jail.39 As a
result defendant claimed that the Act of 1967 violated the "free exer-
cise" clause since it prevented him from exercising his religion; violated
the "equal protection" clause since it favored one religion (peace reli-
gions) over others (Catholicism); and thereby "established" one religion
at the expense of another.40
With respect to the "free exercise" issue the court stated that direct
restrictions on the exercise of religion have been upheld in the past in
cases dealing with the protection of society's health and morals by re-
straining affirmative acts required by the religion.41  However, in Mc-
Fadden's case, he was being commanded to perform an affirmative act-
participation in a war which his conscience determined was unjust. The
court compared McFadden to Sherbert in Sherbert v. Verner.42  In that
case, Sherbert's religion forbade her to work on Saturday, the Sabbath
Day of her faith. Because of her adherence to this religious belief she
was fired and subsequently denied unemployment compensation because
jobs were available if she would forgo her religious belief. The Supreme
Court held that underlying statute unconstitutional since:
37. Id. at 504.
38. Supra note 36, at 504-505.
39. Supra note 36, at 505.
40. Id. As to the impact of such a violation of the equal protection clause on
Catholicism see the amicus curiae brief of the Executive Board of the National
Federation of Priest's Council submitted in support of Negre.
41. Supra note 36, at 505. The Baltimore Catechism, the basic instructional
document for young Catholics, provides that the only exception to the fifth com-
mandment of "thou shall not kill" is "a soldier fighting a just war." BALTIMORE
CATECHISM 147-48 (Official Revised Edition 1949).
42. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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[It] forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and
forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her
religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.43
Nor were her religious principles within the purview of the statute since
they offered no threat to society's health or morals and there existed no
compelling state interests. 4 4
When compared to Sherbert, Judge Zirpoli found that:
[the] statute [Act of 1967] forces defendant McFadden to choose between
following the precepts of his religion and going to jail or abandoning those pre-
cepts in order to avoid jail. Indeed, the case of defendant McFadden is stronger
than Sherbert's, for not only is he faced with jail, but if he abandons his con-
science he will be put in the position of possibly violating the fundamental
precept of his religious belief-the killing of another human being in the cause
of an unjust war.4 5
In dealing with "equal protection" issues, 46 a law which draws a distinc-
tion between classes with respect to primary rights must be supported by
a compelling state interest, 47 or it denies equal protection and violates
due process of law under the fifth amendment. 48  Judge Zirpoli found no
compelling state interest in McFadden. With respect to the argument
that striking the requirement of "war in any form" would result in a
substantial loss of manpower, Zirpoli noted that the same argument
was made after Seeger which struck the requirement of belief in a Su-
preme Being, but no reduction occurred. 49 At the same time, Zirpoli
pointed out that when dealing in the area of primary freedoms the gov-
ernment is required to show that no alternate means exist to satisfy the
same governmental interest.5 0 In the case of selective objectors numer-
ous alternatives are available such as the increasing numbers of indi-
viduals susceptible to the draft, the revocation of college deferments,
43. Supra note 42, at 404.
44. Supra note 42, at 403.
45. Supra note 36, at 506. See THE LIFE AND DEATH OF FRANZ JAGERSTATrER
for an excellent example of a Catholic confronted with the choice of his conscience
in opposition to Hitler's war, who was executed in World War II Germany for his
religious belief in the final authority of the conscience.
46. Inherent in the free exercise clause is the concept that one religious group
cannot be favored over another hence religions must be given equal protection under
the law. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); see also Follett v. McCor-
mick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
47. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, supra
note 42, at 403, 406; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
48. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
49. Supra note 36, at 507.
50. Supra note 36, at 507; see also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
450-452 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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activation of the reserves, or changes in the mental or physical require-
ments to meet the changing needs for manpower.51 Nor would the ex-
tension of C.O. exemption to all selective objectors open the floodgates
for spurious claims or problems in gauging sincerity since these rationales
were rejected in Seeger and Sherbert.5 2 As a result, Zirpoli reasoned,
the Act of 1967 violated the "establishment of religion" clause of the
first amendment in that, in failing to provide equal protection, it prefers
pacifist religions over non-pacifist religions.53
In United States v. Sisson,54 the second case involving the selective
conscientious objector in the pre-Gillette era, the district court in grant-
ing Sisson's motion in arrest of judgment declared the Act of 1967 in
violation of constitutional principles. While Sisson was unlike McFad-
den5l5 in that Sisson's religious belief was based on high moral and
ethical beliefs rather than an orthodox religion, the same issues of free
exercise, equal protection and establishment of a religion were posed.
In treatment of these issues the court conceded that Congress has the
constitutional power of conscription, but in the conscription of the con-
scientious objector the conflicting interests of common defense and in-
dividual freedom must be balanced 6 according to their magnitudes at
any given time. In comparing the conflicting interests with respect to
the Vietnam War the Court pointed out that:
The sincerely conscientious man, whose principles flow from reflection, education,
practice, sensitivity to competing claims and a search for a meaningful life, al-
ways brings impressive credentials. When he honestly believes that he will act
wrongly if he kills, his claim obviously has great magnitude. That magnitude
is not appreciably lessened if his belief relates not to war in general, but to a
particular war or to a particular type of war. Indeed a selective conscientious
objector might reflect a more discriminating study of the problem, a more sensitive
conscience, and a deeper spiritual understanding.5 7
51. Supra note 36, at 507.
52. See United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 909 (D. Mass. 1969).
53. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1945) where the
Court described the establishment clause: "Neither a state nor the Federal Gov-
ernment can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another."
54. Supra note 52.
55. See note 36. The issues and arguments are identical in both McFadden and
Sisson since, under Seeger and the incorporation of the Seeger doctrine in subsequent
draft legislation, religion is no longer the test for a religious belief. However, a
religious belief, such as McFadden's and Negre's, based upon the dogma of an
orthodox religion provides a more concrete conflict with the first and fifth amend-
ments.
56. Supra note 52, at 906-908.
57. Supra note 52, at 908.
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Thus the court recognized the need to protect individual belief regardless
of its selectivity.
With respect to the competing interest of the common defense, the
Court pointed out that:
[a] campaign fought with limited forces for limited objects with no likelihood
of a battlefront within this country and without a declaration of war is not a
claim of comparable magnitude. Nor is there any suggestion that in present
circumstances there is a national need for combat service from Sisson as dis-
tinguished from other forms of service by him. The want of magnitude in the
national demand for combat service is reflected in the nation's lack of calls
for sacrifice in any serious way by civilians. 58
Because the magnitude of Sisson's interest was greater, the Court held
that the free exercise clause and the due process clause were violated
by the Act of 1967.
The Court further held that because the Act of 1967 grants C.O.
status to religious pacifists (i.e., Quakers) at the expense of selective
objectors (i.e., Catholics or those opposed to particular wars on high
ethical or moral grounds) it, in effect, established one religion over an-
other and, hence, failed to provide equal protection under the law.5 9
Since the Supreme Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction in Sis-
son,60 its first opportunity to determine the application of C.O. exemption
to selective conscientious objectors was in Gillette.
In view of the liberalization of the "religious training and belief"
clause and the establishment of the parallel test doctrine 6' to expand
the statutory requirements of C.O. exemption in an attempt to avoid the
constitutional issues, the Supreme Court, in Gillette, had the opportunity
to recognize selective conscientious objector exemptions either by way of
a statutory construction of the "participation in war in any form" clause
to include Gillette and Negre within its meaning as it did in Seeger0 2
or to confront the constitutional issues in the manner of McFadden and
Sisson.
The Court, however, took the opposite position with respect to both
the statutory construction of the clause and the constitutional issues in-
volved. Negre and Gillette attempted to provide the Court with a con-
58. Supra note 52, at 909.
59. Supra note 52, at 910-11.
60. United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (1970).
61. Supra note 16.
62. Id. A statutory construction of the clause to mean participation in any
form would have allowed the Court to bring Gillette and Negre within the mean-
ing of the statute, but such a construction would have been without legal precedent
except for the dictum in Sicurella.
struction of the clause to encompass selective objectors much like non-
theistic objectors in Seeger. They contended that the clause was enacted
from Chief Justice Hughes' dissent in United States v. Macintosh63 and
could be construed to require an opposition to any form of participation
in war rather than an opposition to participation in all war (i.e., war in
any form). The Court rejected this statutory construction stating that
it would strain good sense to construe the statute in such a manner,
and furthermore:
[L]egislative materials simply do not support the view that Congress intended
to recognize [just] any conscientious claim . . . as a basis for relieving
the claimant from the general responsibility . . . of military service. The claim
that is recognized by §6(j) is a claim of conscience running against war as
such. [The] claim . . . involving opposition to a particular war only was
plainly [not within] the focus of congressional concern. 64
The Court then held:
Congress intended to exempt persons who oppose participation in all war-
'participation in war in any form'-and that persons who object solely to partici-
pation in a particular war are not within the purview of the exempting section,
even though the latter objection may have such roots in a claimant's conscience
and personality that it is 'religious' in character.6 5
This construction of the statute determined that governmental interests
outweighed the protections normally afforded individual religious belief.
Mr. Justice Marshall likewise dismissed petitioners' contention that the
Court in Sicurella v. United States66 had already interpreted the "par-
ticipation in war in any form" clause consistent with their claims as
selective conscientious objectors. Marshall determined that Sicurella was
not on point since it involved a reservation with respect to an abstract
theocratic war, and not "real shooting wars" which petitioners objected
to and Congress had in mind when it enacted exemption legislation.67
Although Marshall easily dismissed the construction arguments that were
offered to salvage the statute, his dismissal of the constitutional argu-
ments with respect to the "free exercise" and "establishment" clauses was
less convincing.
Petitioners argued that the first amendment provides that Congress
can make no laws respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting
63. 283 U.S. 605 (1931); see Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 at 444,
n.9 (1971).
64. Supra note 1, at 445-446.
65. Supra note 1, at 447.
66. Supra note 23.
67. Supra note 1, at 446-447.
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its free exercise, and the provision of the statute that granted exemp-
tions to religious objectors to all war, and not to selective objectors, in-
terferred with these constitutional rights. While Marshall recognized the
discrimination, he contended that the "establishment" and "free exercise"
clauses were not contravened so long as the statute was fashioned for
valid secular purposes and maintained neutrality.6 8
With respect to neutrality, Marshall argued that the liberalization of
exemption requirements in Welsh v. United States69 and United States
v. Seeger7° eliminated religion as a requirement of the statute and sub-
stituted an "individual belief [in] objection to all war. . .".. 1 As a
result, the statute does not encourage or favor selected religions or mem-
bership in religious organizations, but merely limits the extent of the
exemption within the purview of the valid secular and neutral reasons
for enactment of the statute.72
These valid secular reasons are the needs of fairness in the adminis-
tration of conscription laws to support the manpower requirements in
defense of the country. Marshall contended that since the expansion
of C.O. status to selective objectors would create difficulties in dis-
tinguishing the sincerity of conscientious objection from objections that
were political and subjective in nature, an expansion to selective objec-
tors would interject unfairness in the administration of conscription
laws. 73 The Court therefore concluded:
That it is supportable for Congress to have decided that the objector to all
war-to all killing in war-has a claim that is distinct enough and intense
enough to justify special status, while the objector to a particular war does not.7 4
This conclusion not only dismissed future claims of C.O. status by se-
lective objectors, but established opposition to all war as a prima facie
element of C.O. exemption.
In its decision the Supreme Court slighted many of the salient argu-
ments with respect to the constitutional issues posed by the Act of 1967.
By interpreting the Seeger and Welsh 75 decisions to mean that the test
68. Supra note 1, at 449. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968);
Abbington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
69. Supra note 18.
70. See United States v. Thaxter, supra note 22.
71. Supra note 1, at 454.
72. Supra note 1, at 454, 460.
73. Supra note 1, at 459-462.
74. Supra note 1, at 460.
75. See United States v. Seeger, supra note 18; Welsh v. United States, supra
note 22.
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of C.O. status is exclusively whether an individual holds a sincere and
highly ethical belief of opposition to all war, the Court in effect read
out any religious overtones posed by the Act. This ignores the selective
objectors who, like McFadden and Negre, base their claims upon the
established doctrines of their religion; and to deny them C.O. status is
to deny them a fundamental doctrine of their religion (i.e., an indi-
vididual's conscience is the ultimate determinant of the unjustness of a
war and his participation therein). Such a denial is hardly compatible
with the first and fifth amendments as expressed in Sherbert v. Verner
which requires the statute rather than the individual to bear the burden
of proof when there is a possible conflict with the free exercise of
religion.76 Since the Gillette decision, the Supreme Court has been con-
fronted with the selective conscientious objector on four occasions. 77 In
three of these, the Court summarily vacated the lower court judgments
and remanded them for reconsideration in light of its decision in Gil-
lette.78 In the fourth, United States v. Clay,79 the Court reversed the
conviction of Clay on procedural grounds, but reaffirmed the C.O. ex-
emption requirements of sincerity of belief,80 orthodox religious or high-
ly ethical or moral beliefs, 81 and opposition to all "real shooting wars"
in any form.82 At the same time the lower courts have rejected selective
conscientious objector claims on the basis of Gillette without discussion
or elaboration.83  As a result the trend of liberalization of conscientious
76. Supra note 43. See Judge Zirpoli's arguments in United States v. McFadden
at note 45.
77. Clay v. United States, 400 U.S. 990 (1971); United States v. Shields,
401 U.S. 1007 (1971); Moore v. United States, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971); United
States v. McFadden, supra note 36.
78. Id.
79. Supra note 76.
80. Supra note 76. See United States v. Seeger, supra note 18.
81. Supra note 76. See United States v. Seeger, supra note 18; Welsh v.
United States, supra note 22.
82. Gillette v. United States at note 72.
83. The lower courts have consistently applied "opposition to all war" as a part
of the prima facie case of the conscientious objector since Gillette. See United
States v. Doran, 438 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1971); Kurtz v. Laird, 449 F.2d 210
(5th Cir. 1971); United States v. McKinley, 447 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1971); Daven-
port v. Laird at note 34; Armstrong v. Laird at note 34; United States v. Kaplan,
327 F. Supp. 1086 (1971); United States v. Quattrucci, 329 F. Supp. 615 (1971).
But for an important construction of the Gillette case see Thomas v. Salatich,
328 F. Supp. 18, 23 (1971). In that case the government claimed that letters and
statements made by the petitioner which were directed against the Vietnam War
showed his opposition to a particular war and thereby precluded C.O. status. The
court rebutted this contention and stated that where the evidence shows an opposi-
tion to all war opposition to a particular war does not preclude C.O. status since
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objector exemption has ceased, if not reversed. s 4  More importantly,
however, the Court has again sidestepped any confrontation between
selective service legislation and the free exercise and equal protection
clauses of the first and fifth amendments.85
James Michael Newton
it is logical and axiomatic that a person who opposes all war must also oppose a
particular one.
84. See Armstrong v. Laird at note 34 where that court equated failure to
object to all war with insincerity of belief.
85. See Douglas dissent in Gillette v. United States at note 1, 463-474.
